RESEARCH ARTICLE

An efficient anonymous communication protocol for wireless sensor networks

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ABSTRACT

Anonymous communication is very important for many wireless sensor networks, because it can be used to hide the identity of important nodes, such as the base station and a source node. In sensor networks, anonymous communication includes several important aspects, such as source anonymity, communication relationship anonymity, and base station anonymity. Existing sensor network anonymous schemes either cannot achieve all the anonymities or have large computation, storage, and communication overheads. In this paper, we propose an efficient anonymous communication protocol for sensor networks that can achieve all the anonymities while having small overheads on computation, storage, and communication. We compare our anonymous communication protocol with several existing schemes, and the results show that our protocol provides strong anonymity protection and has low overheads. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KEYWORDS
anonymous communication; sensor networks; security

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1. INTRODUCTION

A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of many sensor nodes spatially distributed in a certain area [1–3]. Sensor nodes sense environmental conditions, and the sensing data is sent hop by hop to a base station. There are many applications of WSNs ranging from military to civilian in nature. Security is an essential issue for WSNs deployed in hostile environments, such as military battlefields. In the past few years, WSN security has been a topic of intensive study. However, anonymity, as an important security issue in WSN, has not been well studied yet.

An effective anonymous communication protocol for WSN can prevent attackers from identifying (and then capturing) important nodes (such as source and base station). Global attackers may locate a node by using localization techniques such as triangulation, angle of arrival, and signal strength [4–6]. In WSN, sensor nodes use their identities for message receiving and forwarding. Besides, the base station knew where the event happened by the source nodes’ identity. So, if each node uses its constant identity for communication, attackers can trace the source node or the base station by analyzing the identities. If an attacker knows the identity and location of each node, he will be able to selectively compromise more important nodes, which will allow him to get much more information and/or cause more damages to the network. Different from wired networks and many other types of wireless networks such as ad hoc networks [7–11], WSN is a many-to-one network, where all sensor nodes send data to one base station. With the communication relationship among neighboring nodes, attackers may be able to infer the location of a source node and the base station [12]. The graphical location of a sender, namely the source node, reveals the event occurrence. The base station is the center of a sensor network. It would cause much damage if the identity/location of an event source or the base station is revealed. Therefore, an effective anonymous communication protocol is essential for WSN security, and it should at least achieve the following three kinds of anonymities: sender anonymity, communication relationship anonymity, and the base station anonymity. Because typical sensor nodes have very limited resources in batteries, computational capabilities, and storage [13–16], the anonymous communication protocol should be efficient, that is, with small computation and storage requirements.
In this paper, we propose an efficient anonymous communication (EAC) protocol for sensor networks. Our contributions are threefolds:

(1) We show that none of the existing WSN anonymous communication protocols can achieve all three kinds of anonymities.

(2) We propose an efficient anonymous communication protocol, EAC, that guarantees the three kinds of anonymities: sender, communication relationship, and base station anonymity.

(3) EAC is lightweight and only uses hashing function and symmetric cryptography. Compared with existing anonymous communication protocols, EAC provides full anonymity while incurring low storage computation and communication costs.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state the anonymity problem in WSN. After that, we discuss and analyze the anonymity properties of several related works in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our EAC protocol. We provide the security and performance analyses in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Anonymity in sensor networks means preventing a third party from knowing the identity of the two primary parties in a communication. Each node plays a different role in the network. A source node is a sensor close to the event spot and generates messages to the base station. Normal nodes on route are responsible for message relay. The base station is the controller of the network and carries out many tasks. An important node such as a source node or the base station plays a critical role in the network. A smart attacker may first try to identify important nodes and then compromise these nodes, which can cause great damage to the network.

Node identity anonymity and anonymous communication can prevent the aforementioned selectively attacks. Anonymity in the context of a sensor network includes sender anonymity, receiver anonymity, and unlinkability between the sender and the receiver. With the aforementioned anonymities, an adversary is not able to determine the sender and receiver’s identities by reading a message intercepted from the network or through reading messages forwarded by a compromised sensor node. The adversary cannot determine whether two transmissions (from different nodes) are relaying the same message either.

In this paper, we study the important issue of node identity anonymity and anonymous communication. We propose several effective anonymous schemes that can hide node identity and relay messages between sensors and the base station. Our anonymous schemes can be used with any existing sensor routing protocols. We do not propose any new routing protocol in this paper.

3. RELATED WORK

A number of literatures (e.g., [17–19]) have studied anonymity in ad hoc networks. However, the anonymous protocols designed for ad hoc networks are not suitable for WSNs because of the large computation and communication overheads [5]. Misra and Xue [20] proposed two anonymous schemes for clustered WSNs, namely Simple Anonymity Scheme (SAS) and Cryptographic Anonymity Scheme (CAS). The former uses a pool of pseudonyms for anonymous identity generation, and the latter uses hashing function and symmetric cryptography. However, if a sensor node along the routing path is compromised, then neither SAS nor CAS achieves sender anonymity. The reason is given as follows.

Under SAS and CAS, the source node $i$ sends a message to the base station through a neighbor node $j$ with the form $A_{ij} \parallel E_k(A_{i,BS} \parallel \text{data})$, where $A_{ij}$ and $A_{i,BS}$ represent the one-hop anonymous identity and the end-to-end anonymous identity, respectively. Although $A_{ij}$ changes hop by hop, $A_{i,BS}$ does not change. Furthermore, the $A_{ij}$ used by the first hop (i.e., from the source node $i$) is the same as $A_{i,BS}$. If a node (suppose $j$) along the pass is compromised, then the attacker knows $A_{i,BS}$, and he can find out the source node, which is the node whose one-hop anonymous identity is $A_{ij} = A_{i,BS}$.

Nezhad et al. [21] proposed Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing Protocol for Sensornets (DCARPS) to protect the base station anonymity in WSN. Under DCARPS, each node has two constant anonymous IDs, one for message receiving and another for message forwarding. However, later, we will show that DCARPS cannot provide the base station anonymity, nor the communication relationship anonymity.

In DCARPS, a broadcast tree structure is used for communications. The one-hop neighbors of the base station use the same anonymous ID to send messages to the base station, as the base station is the parent node of all these one-hop nodes. However, for any other sensor node (besides the base station), its neighbors may use different anonymous IDs to send out messages, because the probability of all neighbor nodes having the same parent node is very small. With the aforementioned differences, an eavesdropper can find out the base station.

In DCARPS, sensors use a broadcast tree to transmit data to the base station. Consider an example in Figure 1, node $D$ is the parent node of nodes $A$, $B$, and $C$. When $A$, $B$, and $C$ send data packets to $D$, they use the same anonymous receiving ID. A global observer can easily find out node $D$’s location, which is an overlapping area of the three transmissions. Hence, the parent–child relationship is exposed and so is the communication relationship between the nodes.

Sheu et al. [5] proposed a new anonymous communication protocol for WSN, namely Anonymous Path Routing (APR), that includes routing setup stage and anonymous communication stage. In the first stage, source node finds the path to the base station by broadcast. However, as
Figure 1. Localizing the parent node.

Figure 2. Clustering nodes according to the timing of broadcast messages.

The attacker nodes have much stronger capabilities than the sensor nodes. The attacker nodes not only has global eavesdropping ability but also can compromise some sensor nodes and launch active attacks. Specifically, the attacker nodes have the following capabilities:

- **Resource rich**: Attackers have sufficient energy supply, computation capability, and storage memory. They are able to locate a sensor node by measuring the arrival angle and the signal strength of its packets.
- **Passive attacks**: Several attacker nodes may be scattered throughout the network and collaboratively eavesdrop on communications among sensor nodes.
- **Active attacks**: Attackers can physically capture sensor nodes, control them, and mount attacks such as denial-of-service, replay, and forging attacks. The compromised nodes may be located anywhere in the network. However, attackers cannot compromise too many sensor nodes within a short period, as several methods [22–24] could detect this attack and take defensive actions accordingly [25].

4. The efficient anonymous communication protocol

4.1. Network and attack models

We envision a network of hundreds of small wireless sensors that are randomly and uniformly distributed in a field. A base station collects sensing data from the sensors.

Before deployment, each sensor node $i$ is preloaded with several parameters: random numbers $\beta_i$ and $\alpha_i$, hashing functions $H_1$ and $H_2$, node ID—$ID_i$, and pairwise keys $k_i$ and $k_{ib}$. For it to be simple, suppose that the random numbers, $ID_i$, and $H_1$ are $n_1$ bits. Keys and $H_2$ are $n_2$ bits. We summarize the notations in Table I.

4.2. Network predeployment

As in several literatures (e.g., [25]), we assume the network is secure (e.g., no attacks) for a short period after sensor nodes are deployed. During this period, the communications among sensor nodes are secure. We also assume that sensors may use a secure location discovery service (e.g., [26]) to estimate their locations and that no GPS receiver is required at each node.

Our EAC protocol utilizes existing broadcast schemes originated from the base station [4]. After the broadcast process, each node (say, $i$) can find out the smallest hop count between itself and the base station. Then, $i$ exchanges information with its neighbors by a one-hop broadcast message $<\text{BRO}, h, ID_i, k_i, \beta_i, \alpha_i, \beta_i, \text{Hop}_i, \text{bs}>$, where $\text{BRO}$, $h$, and $\text{Hop}_i, \text{bs}$ stand for the broadcast flag, the number of hops by broadcast, and the smallest hop count between $i$ and the base station,

\[ \begin{aligned}
AI_i &= H_1(ID_i \oplus \alpha_i) \\
BAI_i &= H_1(ID_i \oplus \beta_i)
\end{aligned} \]  

(1)

4.3. Network initialization

As in several literatures (e.g., [25]), we assume the network is secure (e.g., no attacks) for a short period. During this period, the communications among sensor nodes are secure. We also assume that sensors may use a secure location discovery service (e.g., [26]) to estimate their locations and that no GPS receiver is required at each node.

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respective. On receiving a one-hop broadcast message (as previously) from its neighbor \( j \), \( i \) calculates a new random number \( \alpha_{i \rightarrow j} \) and a new pairwise key \( k_{1 \rightarrow j} \) between nodes \( i \) and \( j \) by hashing the values of \( ID_i \oplus ID_j \) and \( k_i + k_j + \alpha_i + \alpha_j \) using different hashing functions, respectively, as shown in Equations (2) and (3). Node \( i \) also establishes three anonymous identities, \( BAI_j \), \( OHAI_{i \rightarrow j} \), and \( AAI_i \). The first \( BAI_j \) is calculated by Equation (1). The first value of \( OHAI_{i \rightarrow j} \) and \( AAI_i \) are calculated by hashing the values of \( \alpha_i \oplus \alpha_j \) and \( ID_i \), respectively (refer to Equation (4)).

On the basis of the smallest hop counts from nodes \( i \) and \( j \) to the base station, say, \( Hop_{i,bs} \) and \( Hop_{j,bs} \), \( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \) is determined as follows: if \( Hop_{i,bs} > Hop_{j,bs} \), then set \( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \) as an uplink; if \( Hop_{i,bs} = Hop_{j,bs} \), then set \( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \) as a randlink; and if \( Hop_{i,bs} < Hop_{j,bs} \), then set \( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \) as a downlink.

\[
\alpha_{i \rightarrow j} = H_1(ID_i \oplus ID_j) \tag{2}
\]

\[
k_{1 \rightarrow j} = H_2(k_i + k_j + \alpha_i + \alpha_j) \tag{3}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&OHAI_{i \rightarrow j} = H_1(\alpha_i \oplus \alpha_j) \\
&AAI_i = H_1(ID_i)
\end{align*} \tag{4}
\]

After one-hop broadcast, node \( i \) creates a neighbor information table \( T_i \) that contains entries for links between itself and its one-hop neighboring nodes. Each entry has the fields \( BAI_j, OHAI_{i \rightarrow j}, AAI_j, \alpha_{i \rightarrow j}, \beta_j, k^j_h, k_{1 \rightarrow j} \), and \( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \). The initial neighboring information table \( T_i \) of node \( i \) is shown in Table II. In order to save storage space and remove privacy information, node \( i \) deletes the following information: \( ID_1, Hop_{i,bs} \), and the one-hop broadcast message \( \text{BRO, } h = 1, ID_j, k_j, k^j_h, \alpha_j, \beta_j, Hop_{j,bs} \) of each neighbor \( j \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I. List of notations.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N'_{rel} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Hop_{i,bs} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( T_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_{i \rightarrow j} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( k_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( k_{1 \rightarrow j} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( E_k(D) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( A_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( OHAI_{i \rightarrow j} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BAI_j )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( AAI_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S_{AA} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table II. The neighboring table at node ( i ).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous broadcast identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-hop anonymous identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous acknowledgement identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared random number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared broadcast random number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared broadcast key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared one-hop key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link direction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Four efficient schemes for anonymous communications

Our EAC consists of four efficient schemes: anonymous data sending, anonymous data forwarding, anonymous broadcast, and anonymous acknowledgement (ACK). We present the details of the four schemes in Sections 4.4.1–4.4.4, respectively. We describe a secure node addition scheme in Section 4.4.5.

4.4.1. Anonymous data sending.

This scheme is performed right after the network is initialized. Considering the source node’s anonymity, when a source node wants to send a message to the base station multihops away, the source node uses a global anonymous identity to represent its real identity and changes anonymous identity after every message sending. For example, if source node \( i \) wants to send its sensed data \( D \) to the base station, it first chooses a forwarding node on the basis of a probabilistic forwarding node selection scheme, which is described later. A node, say, \( i \), classifies its neighbors into three sets according to their link direction values—\( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \). Then \( i \) selects a forwarding node from these three sets with different probabilities. To ensure
that messages can be delivered to the base station, neighboring nodes whose link direction value is uplink should be selected with a high probability, more than 0.5. If \( j \) is the selected node, then \( i \) sends \( j \) a message with the form

\[
M_{i \rightarrow j} = OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \parallel E_{k_{i \rightarrow j}} \times (AI_{j} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D) \parallel H(AI_{j} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D)))
\]

(5)

Afterwards, node \( i \) updates \( AI_{j} \) by hashing the value of \( AI_{j} \oplus \delta_{i} \) (refer to Equation (6)). Both \( i \) and \( j \) update \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) by hashing the value of \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \oplus \delta_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) (refer to Equation (6)). During the aforementioned process, a global eavesdropper only observes a broadcast transmission in the neighborhood of node \( i \) and \( j \), but it cannot tell who the sender (or receiver) is because the aforementioned message \( M_{i \rightarrow j} \) (Equation (5)) does not reveal any node identity information. If \( j \) is the base station, then \( j \) decrypts the payload by \( k_{i \rightarrow j} \) and obtains \( AI_{j} \). Only the base station knows which sensor node is the owner of \( AI_{j} \). The base station knows \( k_{i} \), and it can obtain the sensing data \( D \). After that, the base station updates node \( i \)'s global anonymous identity \( AI_{i} \) by Equation (5), which will be used for the next message from node \( i \).

\[
\begin{align*}
AI_{i} &= H_{1}(AI_{i} \oplus \delta_{i}) \\
OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} &= H_{1}(OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \oplus \delta_{i \leftrightarrow j})
\end{align*}
\]

(6)

4.4.2. Anonymous data forwarding.

This scheme is used to conceal the data forwarding relationship among neighboring nodes. When a sensor node \( j \) receives a message with the form \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \parallel E_{k_{i \rightarrow j}}(AI_{i} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D) \parallel H(AI_{i} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D))) \), \( j \) compares the \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) field with the anonymous identities in its table \( T_{j} \). If there is no match, this means the message is not for \( j \) and \( j \) drops the message. If the \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) field matches an entry of \( T_{j} \), then it means that this message is for node \( j \), and \( j \) uses the corresponding shared one-hop key \( k_{i \rightarrow j} \) to decrypt the message. Node \( j \) chooses the next forwarding node \( r \) by using the probabilistic forwarding node selection scheme (see Section 4.4.1), encrypts the payload data by \( k_{j \rightarrow r} \), and sends the message to \( r \) with the form \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow r} \parallel E_{k_{j \rightarrow r}}(AI_{i} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D) \parallel H(AI_{i} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D))) \). Afterwards, \( j \) updates both the one-hop anonymous identities \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) and \( OHAI_{r \leftrightarrow j} \).

4.4.3. Anonymous broadcasting.

This scheme can be applied to both unicast and multihop broadcast. It includes two subschemes: anonymous broadcast and probabilistic latency-based transmission. With anonymous broadcast, the attacker, even compromised some nodes, cannot distinguish broadcast messages from other (e.g., unicast) messages. If an attacker can identify broadcast messages, they can infer the location of the broadcast-originating node who originates the broadcast according to the transmission time order of different node. Usually, as the controller of the network, base station originates broadcast frequently. So, without anonymous broadcast, the base station can be located and thus can be attacked.

The anonymous broadcast scheme is presented in the following. First, a source node \( i \) broadcasts a message to its one-hop neighbors. Node \( i \) encrypts data with key \( k_{b}^{i} \) and uses an anonymous broadcast identity for the message, that is, \( M_{B} = BAI_{i} \parallel k_{b}^{i}(D \parallel H(D)) \). Then \( i \) updates its anonymous broadcast identity by hashing the value of \( BAI_{i} \oplus \beta_{i} \) (refer to Equation (7)). To avoid accepting duplicate messages from the same broadcast, \( i \) also updates neighbors’ anonymous broadcast identities according to Equation (7). When node \( j \) receives \( M_{B} \cdot j \), it checks if there is any entry in \( T_{j} \) matching \( BAI_{i} \). If so, \( j \) adds a random delay before forwarding the message. The random delay is used to hide the timing order of transmissions. Then, \( j \) decrypts the payload using \( k_{b}^{j} \) and encrypts it by \( k_{b}^{j} \). Afterwards, \( j \) replaces the anonymous broadcast identity by \( BAI_{j} \) and broadcasts to its one-hop neighbors a message in the following form: \( BAI_{j} \parallel k_{b}^{j}(D \parallel H(D)) \). Then \( j \) updates all its neighbors’ anonymous broadcast identities as \( i \) does. Node \( j \)'s neighbors will broadcast the message in a similar way. The message will be broadcasted in the entire network, one hop at a time.

\[
BAI_{j} = H_{1}(BAI_{j} \oplus \beta_{j})
\]

(7)

4.4.4. Anonymous acknowledgement.

After a message is successfully transmitted, both the sender and the receiver update their anonymous identities. However, message loss and transmission errors may occur, which may cause the sender and the receiver out of synchronization. This will cause problems for future communications between the two nodes. To solve the aforementioned problem, we propose an anonymous ACK scheme as follows. When a node \( i \) wants to send a message, it generates an anonymous ACK identity (AAI) by hashing the value of \( AAI_{i} \oplus \alpha_{i} \) using Equation (8), inserts it into table \( T_{i} \), encrypts it as part of the payload, and sends \( j \) a message as shown in Equation (9):

\[
AAI_{i} = H_{1}(AAI_{i} \oplus \alpha_{i})
\]

(8)

\[
M_{i \rightarrow j} = D_{\text{rand}}(OHAI_{i \rightarrow j} \parallel E_{k_{i \rightarrow j}} \times (AAI_{j} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D) \parallel H(AAI_{j} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D)))
\]

(9)

where \( D_{\text{rand}} \) is a random padding that makes the length of message sent from a source node the same as that of a data message relayed by a normal node. On receiving this message, the receiver \( j \) decrypts the message, obtains the AAI, and adds it as part of the message to the next sensor \( r \).

\[
M_{j \rightarrow r} = AAI_{j} \parallel OHAI_{j \rightarrow r} \parallel E_{k_{j \rightarrow r}} \times (AAI_{j} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D) \parallel H(AAI_{j} \parallel E_{k_{j}}(D)))
\]

(10)
If the sender $i$ overhears the message (from $j$ to $r$) with the same AAI, it knows that the message has been received by $j$ correctly. After that, both the sender $i$ and receiver $j$ update their shared anonymous identity. If node $j$ does not overhear a message with the same AAI after a timeout period, $i$ assumes $j$ did not receive message $M_{i \rightarrow j}$ correctly (because of message loss or transmission errors), and $i$ retransmits $M_{i \rightarrow j}$ to $j$. Node $j$ can tell this is a retransmitted message according to AAI$_i$ and, in this case, $j$ will send to $i$ an explicit ACK message in the form of $\text{AAI}_i||D_{\text{rand}}$. In case an ACK message is lost, $j$ also waits for a fixed period, say, $T$. After that, $j$ updates its $\text{OHAI}_{i \rightarrow j}$ and is in synchronization with $i$’s again. In order to behave like a sensor node, for each received message, the base station also sends an ACK message back to its neighboring sensor nodes.

### 4.4.5. Secure node addition.

Once a node is useless by an attack or out of energy, a new node, say $i$, should be added to the network. The secrets of $i$ are either known by itself or shared between $i$ and its neighbors. Node $i$’s own secrets, such as $k_i$, $\alpha_i$, . . . , can be loaded in advance. And other secrets of $i$ can be generated by both node $i$ and its neighbors after $i$ is authenticated successfully by its neighbors. Node $i$ can pass the authentication with the help of a trusted party such as the base station. The base station broadcasts a message with the form of $h||E_{k_i}(k_s)||E_{k_j}(k_s)||\ldots$ using the anonymous broadcasting scheme in Section 4.4.3, where $h$ is a hop count field and increases when propagating. When a node is newly added to the network, the hop count of other nodes and the link directions may change. Each node gets its hop count by reading $h$ in the broadcast message, and then each node updates its link directions. In the broadcast message, $k_s$ is a one-time session key that has already been preloaded in node $i$. Nodes $j$ and $r$ are $i$’s neighbors, and they can get $k_s$ by decrypting the corresponding part of the broadcast message. Hence, node $i$ will be able to pass the authentication from its neighbors by using $k_s$. Then, $i$ can communicate with its neighbors and generate their sharing secrets securely by $k_s$. As all the information is encrypted by $k_s$, it is impossible for attackers to know the secrets shared by node $i$ and its neighbors even if attackers know when node $i$ is added to the network.

### 5. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In EAC, no two transmissions (either the same or different messages) use the same node identity. Recall that each message uses different anonymous identity and is encrypted hop by hop. A message has different appearance after every hop. Global passive attackers can only observe many transmissions but they cannot find out the source node, the communication relationship, and the base station. Later, we will mainly analyze the anonymity performance of EAC under active attacks.

#### 5.1. Sender anonymity

Active attackers may compromise some sensor nodes and decrypt messages received by (and sent from) these nodes. Denotes $S_{\text{AAI}}$ as the global identities obtained from the decrypted messages. In the following (Theorem 5.2), we will show that even with $S_{\text{AAI}}$, it is hard for active attackers to find out the source node. Thus, sender anonymity is ensured.

**Lemma 5.1.** For $\forall i \in N$, it is impossible for node $i$ to compute the pairwise key $k_{r \leftrightarrow j}$ shared between nodes $j$ and $r$, where $i \neq r \neq j$.

**Proof.** We discuss two cases depending on whether nodes $j$ and $r$ are neighbors of node $i$ or not.

1. If $j \in N_{\text{nei}}^i$ and $r \in N_{\text{nei}}^j$, then node $i$ knows $k_{i \leftrightarrow j}$ and $k_{i \leftrightarrow r}$. By Equation (3), we have $k_{r \leftrightarrow j} = H_2(k_r + k_j + \alpha_r + \alpha_j)$. In order to calculate $k_{r \leftrightarrow j}$, one needs to know both $k_r$ and $k_j$. However, $k_r$ ($k_j$) is only known by node $r$ ($j$). Hence, it is impossible for node $i$ to compute $k_{r \leftrightarrow j}$.

2. If $j \notin N_{\text{nei}}^i$ or $r \notin N_{\text{nei}}^i$, then node $i$ knows even less information of nodes $r$ and $j$. And it is impossible for node $i$ to compute $k_{r \leftrightarrow j}$.

**Theorem 5.2.** It is hard for attackers to find out a source node under both passive and active attacks.

**Proof.** Suppose node $i$ is the source node, and $i$ sends out a message to $j$ with the form $M_{i \rightarrow j} = D_{\text{rand}}||\text{OHAI}_{i \rightarrow j}||E_{k_{i \rightarrow j}}(\text{AAI}_i||E_{k_{j \rightarrow i}}(D))$. To provide the sender anonymity, $i$ uses a global anonymous identity $\text{AI}_i$ for end-to-end (from $i$ to the base station) communication. If $M_{i \rightarrow j}$ is not relayed by any compromised node before it arrives at the base station, the attacker does not see the global anonymous identity $\text{AI}_i$. Hence, the attacker does not know who the source node is. Let $N_{\text{comp}}$ denotes the set of compromised nodes. If $i \notin N_{\text{comp}}$ and $M_{i \rightarrow j}$ is relayed by some compromised nodes before it arrives at the base station, then $\text{AI}_i \notin S_{\text{AAI}}$. Because node $i$ uses a different global anonymous identity for sending out each message, the attacker cannot tell whether an identity in $S_{\text{AAI}}$ belongs to the same node or not. Hence, the attacker still cannot find out the source node.

In the worst case, if $i \in N_{\text{comp}}$, then the attacker has access to all the information of node $i$ and is able to find out that $i$ is the source node. To be more precise, assume that the average number of messages captured by the attacker from a compromised node is $\gamma$ and that there are $|N_{\text{comp}}|$ compromised nodes. In order to get all the global anonymous identities from these captured messages, attackers need $Z_\gamma$ decryptions as shown in Equation (11). On the other hand, attackers try to find the source node by $|S_{\text{AAI}}|$ hashing operations on each node using (5). As if a compromised node was ever a source node, it must have used a

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val
large. However, the probability that a source node is compromised has a chance of compromising a source node. If \( \delta \) is large, the communication relationship between two compromised neighboring nodes. Although an attacker can identify a broadcast message within the transmission range of each compromised node, he cannot find out the base station by the timing order of the broadcast transmissions, because a random delay is added for each broadcast message. Hence, the base station anonymity is provided.

In all, sender anonymity is guaranteed by the anonymous data sending scheme. As each source node uses a global anonymous identity instead of its real identity and changes anonymous identity after every message sending, it is difficult for attackers to trace the source node by analyzing anonymous identities from captured messages. Communication relationship anonymity is achieved by the anonymous data forwarding scheme. By this scheme, one node forwards a message to one of its neighboring node by a hidden identity that is only shared between them. So, the message sender and receiver are unlinkable. And the anonymous broadcasting scheme is used to conceal the broadcast-originating node that may be the source node or the base station. Different from the aforementioned three anonymous schemes, the anonymous ACK scheme is not designed for any of the three anonymity. It is used to deal with problems such as message loss and transmission errors that may cause anonymous identities' updating between two neighboring nodes out of synchronization. So, with the anonymous ACK scheme, the other three anonymous schemes can provide anonymous communication with reliability.

We compare the anonymous performance of our EAC protocol with several existing anonymous schemes in Table III. It can be seen from Table III that only EAC achieves all the anarchies, whereas the other schemes cannot.

6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the EAC protocol, including the storage, computation, and communication costs. For anonymous end-to-end communications, each node \( i \) stores three parameters, \( AI_i, \alpha_i, \) and \( k_i \) for global anonymous identity generation and data encryption. For anonymous one-hop communication, for each of its neighbor \( j, i \) has to store \( OHAI_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) and \( \alpha_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) for generating the one-hop anonymous identity. Node \( i \) also has to store \( AAl_{i}, \alpha_{i}, \) and \( k_{i \leftrightarrow j} \) for generating the AAI and one-hop message encryption. For anonymous broadcast communication, \( i \) stores \( BAI_{i}, \beta_{1}, \) and \( k_{b} \) to create anonymous broadcast identity and encryp the broadcast message. Node \( i \) also stores \( BAl_{j}, \beta_{j}, \) and \( k_{b} \) for broadcast message authentication and decryption. For forwarding node selection, \( i \) needs to store the \( linkdir_{i \rightarrow j} \) for each of its neighbor \( j \).

There are three possible link directions, so the link direction can be represented by 2 bits. Hence, the total memory
Table III. Comparison of anonymity performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anonymous communication protocols</th>
<th>Sender anonymity</th>
<th>Communication relationship anonymity</th>
<th>Base station anonymity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>unsatisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>unsatisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>unsatisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>unsatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCARPS</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>unsatisfied</td>
<td>unsatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
<td>satisfied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAS, Simple Anonymity Scheme; CAS, Cryptographic Anonymity Scheme; APR, Anonymous Path Routing; DCARPS, Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing Protocol for Sensornets; EAC, Efficient Anonymous Communication.

The requirement for one node is \(4n_1 + 2n_2 + (5n_1 + 2n_2)C + 2\) bits, where \(C\) denotes the average number of neighbors for each node. If \(n = n_1 = n_2\), then the memory cost is \(6n + 7nC + 2\) bits. For instance, in a WSN with 1000 nodes, let \(n = 128\) (e.g., MD5 has 128-bit hash code), and each node has an average neighbor size of 30 nodes. The memory requirement shall be \(6 \times 128 + 7 \times 128 \times 30 + 2 = 27,650\) bits = 3.456 bytes = 3.38 kB. For a WSN with 5000 nodes and a neighborhood size of 100 nodes, the memory requirement shall be \(6 \times 128 + 7 \times 128 \times 100 + 2 = 90,370\) bits = 11.03 kB. A TelosB mote (Crossbow Technology Inc., Milpitas, CA, USA) [20] has 1-MB flash memory and 48-kB RAM. Hence, it is feasible to implement our EAC protocol in today’s sensor nodes.

Our EAC is a lightweight protocol because it only uses hashing functions and symmetric cryptography. In order to accept and forward a message, each node needs two hashing operations for one-hop anonymous identities updating and one hashing operation for AAI updating. Besides, each node needs one hashing operation for message digest. Table IV compares the storage and computation costs of our EAC protocol with several existing sensor anonymous communication protocols. Note that we do not include the computation cost of data encryption, as data encryption operation by EAC is the same as the existing anonymous communication protocols [5,20,21].

Table IV shows that DCARPS [21] has the smallest storage and computation cost. However, DCARPS has the worst anonymity and security performance. DCARPS cannot achieve the base station anonymity and the communication relationship anonymity under global passive attacks. Moreover, DCARPS cannot defend active attacks such as replay attacks because all nodes use the same identity for message sending and forwarding. Table IV also shows

Table IV. Performance comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anonymous communication protocols</th>
<th>Storage cost (bits)</th>
<th>Computation cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>(2nN + 4nC + 16)</td>
<td>Generating anonymous IDs from pseudonym space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>(6n + 7nC + 16)</td>
<td>Two hashing operations and two encryption operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>(9n + 7nC + 2N - 2C - 2)</td>
<td>At least six hashing operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCARPS</td>
<td>(3n)</td>
<td>No extra computation cost with constant IDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>(6n + 7nC + 2)</td>
<td>four hashing operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAS, Simple Anonymity Scheme; CAS, Cryptographic Anonymity Scheme; APR, Anonymous Path Routing; DCARPS, Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing Protocol for Sensornets; EAC, Efficient Anonymous Communication.

Table V. Performance comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anonymous communication protocols</th>
<th>Communication cost (number of messages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>(P + N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>(P + N + N \times n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>(N + \gamma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCARPS</td>
<td>No extra communication cost with constant IDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>(N + \gamma)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAS, Simple Anonymity Scheme; CAS, Cryptographic Anonymity Scheme; APR, Anonymous Path Routing; DCARPS, Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing Protocol for Sensornets; EAC, Efficient Anonymous Communication.
that SAS has low computation cost because SAS creates anonymous identities from the pseudonym space, which has light computations. However, EAC uses much less storage than SAS.

Our EAC is independent from any routing protocols. So without considering the specific routing protocol, the communication cost of EAC is \( N + \gamma \). As each node initializes a one-hop broadcast message to exchange information among its neighbors for neighboring table establishment, the communication cost of the whole network for message exchange is \( N \). Besides, according to the anonymous ACK scheme (see Section 4.4.4), once a node receives a message, it should send an anonymous ACK message in case of message loss. So, \( \gamma \) is the communication cost of ACK messages. Anonymous protocols that are not considering reliable communication such as SAS, CAS, and DCAPRS have no such extra overhead. Both SAS and CAS establish pairwise keys for any two nodes and have extra communication cost \( P \). Table V shows that DCAPRS has the smallest communication cost. This is because each node uses its constant IDs for message receiving and forwarding respectively in DCAPRS. So, DCAPRS does not have to exchange messages in the network initialization stage. However, without using anonymous identities, DCAPRS has the worst anonymity and security performance. Note that we do not include the communication cost of initial broadcasting, as initial broadcasting operation by EAC is the same as the other existing anonymous communication protocols.

To sum up, the previous discussions show that our EAC protocol achieves all three anonymities with low storage and computation costs.

7. CONCLUSION

Anonymous communication is very important in WSNs, because it can be used to conceal the identities of important nodes, such as source nodes and the base station. Existing sensor anonymity schemes cannot achieve all the three kinds of anonymities. In this paper, we presented an EAC protocol for sensor networks, and it consists of four schemes: anonymous sending, anonymous forwarding, anonymous broadcasting, and anonymous ACK. Performance analysis and comparison showed that EAC can provide all three anonymities: the sender anonymity, the communication relationship anonymity, and the base station anonymity while incurring small storage, computation, and communication costs.

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