CIS 5515
Design and Analysis of Algorithms

Algorithm Design
JON KLEINBERG • ÉVA TARDOS
Lectures

Lecture time
- W 5:30 pm – 8:00 pm, Tuttleman Learning Center 402
  Zoom: https://temple.zoom.us/j/7348129717 (first two classes)

Office hours
- W 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm, SERC 362

Prereq.
- CIS 5511 (Programming Techniques)

Textbook
- *Algorithm Design* by Éva Tardos and Jon Kleinberg

Course web site
- https://cis.temple.edu/~jiewu/teaching/spring_2022.html
Algorithm.

- [webster.com] A procedure for solving a mathematical problem (as of finding the greatest common divisor) in a finite number of steps that frequently involves repetition of an operation.

- [Knuth, TAOCP] An algorithm is a finite, definite, effective procedure, with some input and some output.

Great algorithms are the poetry of computation. Just like verse, they can be terse, allusive, dense, and even mysterious. But once unlocked, they cast a brilliant new light on some aspect of computing. - Francis Sullivan
Etymology. [Knuth, TAOCP]

- *Algorism* = process of doing arithmetic using Arabic numerals.

- True origin: Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi was a famous 9th century Persian who wrote *Kitab al-jabr wa'l-mugabala*, which evolved into today's high school algebra text.
Scope

Design and analysis of computer algorithms

- Greedy
- Divide-and-conquer
- Dynamic programming
- Network flow
- NP and computational intractability
- Approximation algorithms
- Adversary augments for lower bounds
- ...

Critical thinking, problem-solving, and complexity analysis
Two sample examples

Algorithm design: celebrity problem (Oscar 2022)
- A celebrity does not know anyone while everyone knows him/her.
- Primitive operation: select A and B and then ask A if he/she knows B.
- What is the minimum number of primitive operations needed to find a celebrity in a group of size n?

Algorithm analysis: runner-up team (Super bowl 2022)
- Why no one cares about a runner-up team?
- What is the minimum number of matches needed to determine the second-best team in a league of n teams?
Algorithmic Paradigms

- Randomized algorithm
  - Quicksort: employs a degree of randomness as part of its logic

- Parallel algorithm
  - Bitonic sort, by K. Batcher: run on many machines simultaneously ($\log^2 n$)

- Distributed algorithm (Blockchain, by S. Nakamoto)
  - Can be executed on a distributed system with no central coordinator (delay sensitive)

- Local algorithm (Connected Dominating Set on MANETs, by J. Wu)
  - Local information with global properties
Algorithmic Paradigms (cont’d)

- **Algorithm for security** (e.g., US presidential voting)
  - *Secure voting* by R. Rivest
    - Each voter casts 3 tickets
      - For: mark exactly 2 tickets, Against: mark exactly 1 ticket
      - 3 tickets are separated, mixed with others, and posted in public
      - Voter keeps 1 ticket for verification

![Ballot Example]
Algorithmic Paradigms (cont’d)

- Privacy-preserving algorithm (The Ethical Algorithm, by M. Kearns & A. Roth)
  - Poll: do you like the former president?
    Flip a coin: head (tell the truth) and tail (tell randomly), then $\frac{3}{4}$ time is the truth
  - Algorithmic discrimination and discrimination through optimization.

- Algorithmic game theory (mechanism design to avoid bad equilibrium)
  - Two-path routing
    short path (but proportion to traffic $\times (\leq 1)$) and long path (fixed delay of 1)

- The Master Algorithm, by P. Domingos
  - Machine learning (ML): The algorithm to design all algorithms
    All knowledge - past, current, and future - can be derived from data by a single, universal learning algorithm
Applications

Wide range of applications
- Caching
- Compilers
- Databases
- Scheduling
- Networking
- Data analysis
- Signal processing
- Computer graphics
- Scientific computing
- Operations research
- Artificial intelligence
- Computational biology
- ... 

We focus on algorithms and techniques that are useful in practice.
Introduction:
Some Representative Problems
1.1 Dating: searching for the best mate
Searching for the best mate

**Goal.** Given $n$ candidates for dating, find a "suitable" one for marriage.

- Dating in sequence.
- Accept (for marriage) or reject after each date.
- No more dating after acceptance.
- Best strategy to find a “suitable” one for marriage: **optimal stopping**

Phase 1: always reject the first $n/e$ dates ($e = 2.71828$, natural number)
Phase 2: marry the first date better than all dates in Phase 1

**1/e rule (or 37% rule).** Probability of finding the best mate is $1/e$

Extensions
- Unknown $n$
- $k$ mates ($k=1, 2, 3, 4,...$)
1.1 Matching: a stable marriage
Stable Matching Problem

**Goal.** Given $n$ men and $n$ women, find a "suitable" matching.

- Participants rate members of opposite sex.
- Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
- Each woman lists men in order of preference from best to worst.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men's Preference Profile</th>
<th>Women's Preference Profile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Yancey</td>
<td>Bertha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zeus</td>
<td>Amy</td>
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Stable Matching Problem

Perfect matching: everyone is matched monogamously.
- Each man gets exactly one woman.
- Each woman gets exactly one man.

Stability: no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action.
- In matching M, an unmatched pair m-w is unstable if man m and woman w prefer each other to current partners.
- Unstable pair m-w could each improve by eloping (i.e., run away).

Stable matching: perfect matching with no unstable pairs.

Stable matching problem. Given the preference lists of n men and n women, find a stable matching if one exists.
**Stable Matching Problem**

**Q.** Is assignment X-C, Y-B, Z-A stable?

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<td>Xavier</td>
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**Men's Preference Profile**

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<tr>
<td>Clare</td>
<td>Xavier</td>
<td>Yancey</td>
<td>Zeus</td>
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</table>

**Women's Preference Profile**
Stable Matching Problem

Q. Is assignment X-C, Y-B, Z-A (dark gray) stable?
A. No. Bertha and Xavier will hook up.

Xavier | Amy | Bertha | Clare
Yancey | Bertha | Amy | Clare
Zeus | Amy | Bertha | Clare

Men’s Preference Profile

Amy | Yancey | Xavier | Zeus
Bertha | Xavier | Yancey | Zeus
Clare | Xavier | Yancey | Zeus

Women’s Preference Profile
Stable Matching Problem

**Q.** Is assignment X-A, Y-B, Z-C stable?

**A.** Yes.

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*Men’s Preference Profile*

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<tr>
<td>Clare</td>
<td>Xavier</td>
<td>Yancey</td>
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*Women’s Preference Profile*
Q. Do stable matchings always exist?
A. Not obvious a priori.

Stable roommate problem (or marriage with one gender).
- 2n people; each person ranks others from 1 to 2n-1.
- Assign roommate pairs so that no unstable pairs.

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<td>Adam</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doofus</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
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</table>

is core of market nonempty?

Observation. Stable matchings do not always exist for stable roommate problem.
Propose-And-Reject Algorithm


Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man m
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
    if (w is free)
        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
        assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}
Proof of Correctness: Termination

**Observation 1.** Men propose to women in decreasing order of preference.

**Observation 2.** Once a woman is matched, she never becomes unmatched; she only "trades up."

**Claim.** Algorithm terminates after at most $n^2$ iterations of while loop.

**Pf.** Each time through the while loop a man proposes to a new woman. There are only $n^2$ possible proposals. □

$n(n-1) + 1$ proposals required
Claim. All men and women get matched.

Pf. (by contradiction)

- Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that Zeus is not matched upon termination of algorithm.
- Then some woman, say Amy, is not matched upon termination.
- By Observation 2, Amy was never proposed to.
- But, Zeus proposes to everyone, since he ends up unmatched. □
Proof of Correctness: Stability

Claim. No unstable pairs.
Pf. (by contradiction)

- Suppose $A-Z$ is an unstable pair: each prefers each other to partner in Gale-Shapley matching $S^*$.

  - Case 1: $Z$ never proposed to $A$.
    - $\Rightarrow$ $Z$ prefers his GS partner to $A$.
    - $\Rightarrow$ $A-Z$ is stable.

  - Case 2: $Z$ proposed to $A$.
    - $\Rightarrow$ $A$ rejected $Z$ (right away or later)
    - $\Rightarrow$ $A$ prefers her GS partner to $Z$.
    - $\Rightarrow$ $A-Z$ is stable.

- In either case $A-Z$ is stable, a contradiction.
Summary

**Stable matching problem.** Given \( n \) men and \( n \) women, and their preferences, find a stable matching if one exists.

**Gale-Shapley algorithm.** Guarantees to find a stable matching for any problem instance.

**Q.** How to implement GS algorithm efficiently?

**Q.** If there are multiple stable matchings, which one does GS find?
Efficient Implementation

Efficient implementation. We describe $O(n^2)$ time implementation.

Representing men and women.
- Assume men are named 1, ..., n.
- Assume women are named 1', ..., n'.

Engagements.
- Maintain a list of free men, e.g., in a queue.
- Maintain two arrays $\text{wife}[m]$, and $\text{husband}[w]$.
  - set entry to 0 if unmatched
  - if m matched to w then $\text{wife}[m]=w$ and $\text{husband}[w]=m$

Men proposing.
- For each man, maintain a list of women, ordered by preference.
- Maintain an array $\text{count}[m]$ that counts the number of proposals made by man $m$. 
Women rejecting/accepting.

- Does woman $w$ prefer man $m$ to man $m'$?
- For each woman, create inverse of preference list of men.
- Constant time access for each query after $O(n)$ preprocessing.

```
for i = 1 to n
  inverse[pref[i]] = i
```

Amy preferences:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Amy</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pref</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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Inverse preferences:

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<td>Inverse</td>
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<td>8th</td>
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<td>6th</td>
<td>7th</td>
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Amy prefers man 3 to 6 since $\text{inverse}[3] < \text{inverse}[6]$. 

2 7
Q. For a given problem instance, there may be several stable matchings. Do all executions of Gale-Shapley yield the same stable matching? If so, which one?

An instance with two stable matchings.
- A-X, B-Y, C-Z.
- A-Y, B-X, C-Z.

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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Z</td>
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</table>
Q. For a given problem instance, there may be several stable matchings. Do all executions of Gale-Shapley yield the same stable matching? If so, which one?

Def. Man m is a valid partner of woman w if there exists some stable matching in which they are matched.

Man-optimal assignment. Each man receives best valid partner.

Claim. All executions of GS yield man-optimal assignment, which is a stable matching!
- No reason a priori to believe that man-optimal assignment is perfect, let alone stable.
- Simultaneously best for each and every man.
**Man Optimality**

**Claim.** GS matching $S^*$ is man-optimal.

**Pf.** (by contradiction)

- Suppose some man is paired with someone other than best partner. Men propose in decreasing order of preference $\Rightarrow$ some man is rejected by valid partner.
- Let $Y$ be first such man, and let $A$ be first valid woman that rejects him.
- Let $S$ be a stable matching where $A$ and $Y$ are matched.
- When $Y$ is rejected, $A$ forms (or reaffirms) engagement with a man, say $Z$, whom she prefers to $Y$.
- Let $B$ be $Z$'s partner in $S$.
- $Z$ not rejected by any valid partner at the point when $Y$ is rejected by $A$. Thus, $Z$ prefers $A$ to $B$.
- But $A$ prefers $Z$ to $Y$.
- Thus $A-Z$ is unstable in $S$. □

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<td>Bertha-Zeus</td>
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Since this is first rejection by a valid partner.
Stable Matching Summary

**Stable matching problem.** Given preference profiles of $n$ men and $n$ women, find a stable matching.

- no man and woman prefer to be with each other than assigned partner

**Gale-Shapley algorithm.** Finds a stable matching in $O(n^2)$ time.

**Man-optimality.** In version of GS where men propose, each man receives best valid partner.

- $w$ is a valid partner of $m$ if there exist some stable matching where $m$ and $w$ are paired

**Q.** Does man-optimality come at the expense of the women?
Woman Pessimality

**Woman-pessimal assignment.** Each woman receives worst valid partner.

**Claim.** GS finds **woman-pessimal** stable matching $S^*$.

**Pf.**
- Suppose $A-Z$ matched in $S^*$, but $Z$ is not worst valid partner for $A$.
- There exists stable matching $S$ in which $A$ is paired with a man, say $Y$, whom she likes less than $Z$.
- Let $B$ be $Z$'s partner in $S$.
- $Z$ prefers $A$ to $B$. $\leftarrow$ **man-optimality**
- Thus, $A-Z$ is an unstable in $S$. $\blacksquare$

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<td>Bertha-Zeus</td>
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Other well-known extensions

Stable roommate problem
  - Single gender

College admission problem
  - Multiple matchings

Hospital admission problem*
  - Matching residents to hospital

Stable matching with multiple genders*
  - Traditional marriage: binary
  - Futuristic marriage: k-ary
Goal. Given a set of preferences among hospitals and medical school students, design a *self-reinforcing* admissions process.

Unstable pair: applicant \( x \) and hospital \( y \) are unstable if:
- \( x \) prefers \( y \) to its assigned hospital.
- \( y \) prefers \( x \) to one of its admitted students.

Stable assignment. Assignment with no unstable pairs.
- Natural and desirable condition.
- Individual self-interest will prevent any applicant/hospital deal from being made.
Extensions: Matching Residents to Hospitals

Ex: Men ≈ hospitals, Women ≈ med school residents.

Variant 1. Some participants declare others as unacceptable.

Variant 2. Unequal number of men and women.

Variant 3. Limited polygamy.

Variant 4. Couple

Def. Matching S unstable if there is a hospital h and resident r such that:
- h and r are acceptable to each other; and
- either r is unmatched, or r prefers h to her assigned hospital; and
- either h does not have all its places filled, or h prefers r to at least one of its assigned residents.
Application: Matching Residents to Hospitals

**NRMP.** (National Resident Matching Program)
- Original use just after WWII. ← predates computer usage
- Ides of March, 23,000+ residents.

**Rural hospital dilemma.**
- Certain hospitals (mainly in rural areas) were unpopular and declared unacceptable by many residents.
- Rural hospitals were under-subscribed in NRMP matching.
- How can we find stable matching that benefits "rural hospitals"?

**Rural Hospital Theorem.** Rural hospitals get exactly same residents in every stable matching!
Germany introduces third gender for people who identify as intersex

People who do not fit biological definition of male or female can now choose category 'diverse' on official documents

Maya Oppenheim | @mayaoppenheim | 2 days ago | 245 shares

New York City birth certificates get gender-neutral option

By Evan Simko-Bodnarski, CNN
Updated 6:10 PM ET, Thu January 3, 2019

New York City has changed its policy on gender designation for birth certificates.

GENDER IDENTITY

People should use public restrooms according to:

- The biological sex on their birth certificate 43%
- The gender with which they identify 41%
- Don’t know 16%
Classic Marriage: stable marriage with k genders

When k=2, it is the classic marriage.

E.g., M: male, W: female, U: undecided

Theorem (Wu 2016): There exists preference lists under which there exists no stable binary matching with k (>2) genders.

Proof: Suppose u in a node (in a gender) that is ranked the lowest by all. In all other k-1 gender sets, each node x is ranked the top by exactly another node from a different gender in these k-1 genders, any marriage between u and x is unstable!

Result holds even if self-matching is allowed, e.g., nodes in U can match each other.

\[
\{(m, w), (m', u), (w', u')\} \quad \{(m, w), (m', u'), (w', u)\}
\]
\[
\{(m, w'), (m', u), (w, u')\} \quad \{(m, w'), (m', u'), (w, u)\}
\]
\[
\{(m, u), (m', w), (w', u')\} \quad \{(m, u), (m', w'), (w, u')\}
\]
\[
\{(m, u'), (m', w), (w', u)\} \quad \{(m, u'), (m', u), (u', w)\}
\]
Futuristic Marriage: stable k-ary marriage with k genders

K-ary matching: \((u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_k)\) (k: the number of genders)

**Iterative Binding:** Iteratively apply GS to pair wisely and bind all disjoint sets through a spanning tree.

**Theorem (Wu 2016):** The iterative GS constructs a stable k-ary matching.

**Blocking family** (for instability): if each member prefers each member of that family to its current family.

-E.g., current matching is \(\{(m, w, u), (m', w', u')\}\), \((m', w, u)\) is a blocking family if \(m'\) prefers \(w\) and \(u\) and both \(w\) and \(u\) prefers \(m'\)

J. Wu, "**Stable Matching Beyond Bipartite Graphs,**" (APDCM) (in conjunction with IEEE IPDPS 2016)
Matching Theory in Games

Marriage with one-side domination: without money
Marriage with one-side domination: with money

The 2012 Nobel prize in economics: awarded to
Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley
for “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design“
Trading without Money: Top Trading Cycle (TTC) Algorithm

While women remain, do the following:
1. Let each remaining woman point to her favorite remaining man.
2. Redistribute as suggested by the directed cycles in the graph (including self-loops) and delete the reallocated women and men. All other women keep their current men.

Four desirable properties
1. Strategy-proof
2. Pareto-optimal
3. Individual rationality
4. Unique core allocation

The algorithm is described in section 6, p. 30, and attributed to David Gale.
Example

Agents' ranking from best (left) to worst (right):
1: \( (h_3, h_2, h_4, h_1) \)
2: \( (h_4, h_1, h_2, h_3) \)
3: \( (h_1, h_4, h_3, h_2) \)
4: \( (h_3, h_2, h_1, h_4) \)

Only agents 2 and 4 left with updated preferences:
2: \( (h_4, h_2) \)
4: \( (h_2, h_4) \)

- Cycle: \( (2, h_4, 4, h_2, 2) \).
- So: 2 gets \( h_4 \) and 4 gets \( h_2 \). Done!
- Final match:
  \( (1, h_3), (2, h_4), (3, h_1), (4, h_2) \).

- Cycle: \( (1, h_3, 3, h_1, 1) \).
- So: 1 get \( h_3 \) and 3 gets \( h_1 \). Remove them and iterate.
Top matching with money

- Perfect matching
- Market clearing price


Figure 10.6. The auction procedure applied to the example from Figure 10.5. Each separate picture shows steps (i) and (ii) of successive rounds, in which the preferred-seller graph for that round is constructed. (a) In the first round, all prices start at 0. The set of all buyers forms a constricted set S, with N(S) equal to the seller a. So a raises his price by one unit and the auction continues to the second round. (b) In the second round, the set of buyers consisting of x and z forms a constricted set S, with N(S) again equal to seller a. Seller a again raises his price by one unit and the auction continues to the third round. (Notice that in this round, we could have alternatively identified the set of all buyers as a different constricted set S, in which case N(S) would have been the set of sellers a and b. There is no problem with this—it just means that there can be multiple options for how to run the auction procedure in certain rounds, with any of these options leading to market-clearing prices when the auction comes to an end.) (c) In the third round, the set of all buyers forms a constricted set S, with N(S) equal to the set of two sellers a and b. So a and b simultaneously raise their prices by one unit each, and the auction continues to the fourth round. (d) In the fourth round, when we build the preferred-seller graph, we find it contains a perfect matching. Hence, the current prices are market clearing, and the auction comes to an end.