Fault-Tolerant and Secure Data Transmission Using Random Linear Network Coding

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# Agenda

- Introduction
  - Multi-path network coding
  - Fault tolerance and security
- Fault-tolerant and secure data transmission
  - Problem definition
  - Problem formulation
- Evaluations
- Conclusions



# Introduction

- Multi-path transmission
  - Fault tolerance (FT) via redundancy
    - Transmitting data through multiple paths
    - Paths with different reliabilities
    - More redundancy increases FT, but increases the cost as well
  - Security
    - Encryption, public/private keys
    - Overhead of encryption methods



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# Network Coding

XOR network coding

Single multicast

Two destinations

Capacity of each

link: one packet

Two packets

 $d_1$  and  $d_2$ 

No coding

Coding

#### Source


*s*<sub>1</sub> *s*<sub>1</sub>  $p_2$  $p_1$  $p_1$  $p_2$  $r_1$  $r_2$  $r_1$  $r_2$  $p_1$  $p_1$  $p_2$  $p_2$  $r_3$  $r_3$  $p_1$  $p_1$  $p_2$  $p_1$  $p_2$  $p_1 + p_2$  $r_4$  $r_4$  $p_1 + p_2$  $p_1$  $d_1$  $d_2$  $p_1$  $d_1$  $d_2$  $p_1 + p_2$ 

Destinatinos



# Simple System Setting

• Transmission a file with *m* packets via *n* disjoint paths



- Path failure model
  - If a path fails, all of the transmitted packets over that path fail
- Eavesdropper probability: fixed
  - e.g. in wireless networks depends on location of the eavesdropper
- Objective
  - Balance fault tolerance and security



# Linear Coding

- Random linear network coding Failure prob. • Linear combinations of the packets  $\begin{cases}
  q_1 = \alpha_{1,1}p_1 + \alpha_{1,2}p_2 + \alpha_{1,3}p_3 \\
  q_2 = \alpha_{2,1}p_1 + \alpha_{2,2}p_2 + \alpha_{2,3}p_3 \\
  \vdots \\
  q_k = \alpha_{k,1}p_1 + \alpha_{k,2}p_2 + \alpha_{k,3}p_3
  \end{cases}$ Eavesdropping prob.  $\epsilon_1 \quad \gamma_1 \\
  \epsilon_1 \quad \gamma_1 \\
  \epsilon_2 \quad \gamma_2 \\
  c_n \quad \gamma_n$ 
  - m=3 linearly independent coded packets are sufficient for decoding, using Gaussian elimination
- If we code *m* packets, eavesdropper/destination needs *m* coded packets to retrieve the original packets
- *m* and *n* can be different numbers



# Fault Tolerance and Security

#### • FT

• *m* linearly independent coded packets are sufficient for retrieving the original data

#### Security


- Eavesdropper cannot decode the coded packets unless it has *m* linearly independent packets
- Challenge

More transmitted coded packets

More robust against failures More vulnerable against eavesdropping



- With *n* paths, there are 2<sup>*n*</sup> possible failure/eavesdropping cases
  - *R*<sub>*j*</sub>: set of paths that do not fail
  - $S_j$ : set of overheared paths by eavesdropper



Eavesdropping prob. of the *i*th path


Prob. of paths in set  $\,R_j\,$  not to fail and the rest fail

Prob. that an eavesdropper has only access to data transmitted on the set of paths in  ${\cal S}_{j}$ 



## Problem Formulation-Case 1

- Objective function as a function of FT and security.
  - $x_i$ : rate of transmitted packets over path  $d_i$
  - Sum of  $x_i$  can be greater than 1
  - *R and S*: power set of the paths





## **Problem Formulation- Case 2**

- We set reliability threshold as a constraint.
- We then minimize the eavesdropping probability.

eavesdropping

S

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min \ U = \sum_{S_j \in S} q_j z_j & \begin{array}{ll} \mbox{Minimizing prob. of} \\ \mbox{successful eavesdropp} \end{array} \\ s.t & \sum_{R_j \in R} p_j y_j \geq t & \begin{array}{ll} \mbox{Reliability threshold } t \end{array} \\ y_j \leq \sum_{d_i \in R_j} x_i & \forall \ R_j \in R \end{array} \\ z_j \leq \sum_{d_i \in S_j} x_i & \forall \ S_j \in S \end{array} \\ y_j, z_j \in \{0, 1\} & \forall R_j \in R, \ S_j \in S \end{array}$$



### Problem Formulation- Case 3

- This is the reverse of Case 2.
  - We set eavesdropping prob. threshold as a constraint.
  - We maximize the reliability.

 $\max U = \sum p_j y_j \qquad \text{Maximizing the reliability}$  $R_i \in R$ s.t  $\sum q_j z_j \le t$ Security threshold t  $R_i \in R$  $y_j \leq \sum x_i \quad \forall \ R_j \in R$  $d_i \in R_i$  $z_j \le \sum x_i \quad \forall \ S_j \in S$  $d_i \in S_j$  $y_i, z_i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall \ R_i \in R, S_i \in S$ 



#### Relaxation to Linear Programming, Case 1 (LP)

- NP-complete
  - mixed integer and linear programming optimizations
- Modifying the integer variables to real variables

$$\begin{array}{ll} \max \ U = \sum_{R_j \in R} \alpha \ p_j y_j - \sum_{S_j \in S} (1 - \alpha) \ q_j z_j \\ y_j \leq \sum_{d_i \in R_j} x_i \quad \forall \ R_j \in R \\ \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ng integer} \\ \text{es to real} \quad z_j \leq \sum_{d_i \in S_j} x_i \quad \forall \ S_j \in S \\ y_j, z_j \in (0, 1) \quad \forall \ R_j \in R, S_j \in S \end{array}$$



## Heuristic Solution-HR

- Complexity of the relaxed linear programming
  - Liner to the number of variables and constraints
  - With *n* paths, there are  $2^n$  possible failure/eavesdropping cases
- Heuristic

 $\boldsymbol{S}$ 

• Distribution of the transmissions <u>proportional</u> to the <u>failure rate</u> and <u>eavesdropping prob.</u> of the paths

$$\max U = \sum_{d_i \in D} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha(1 - \epsilon_i)x_i - (1 - \alpha)\gamma_i x_i \end{bmatrix}$$
  
Reliability of the ith path Eavesdropping prob.  
$$t \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \ge 1$$
  
 $x_i \in (0, 1) \quad \forall \ d_i \in D$ 




# Evaluations

- Simulator in Matlab environment
- We use Linprog tool of Matlab to find the solution of the optimizations
- 100 simulation runs
- Two settings
  - LP-*n*: relaxed optimization case 1(linear programming) with *n* paths
  - HR-*n*: heuristic solution with *n* paths



# **Evaluations-**FT


- Path failure prob. of each path: [0,0.1]
- Eavesdropping prob. of each path: [0,0.3]



- Reliability of heuristic (HR) is close to LP
- HR over-estimates the reliability
- More paths enhances the reliability




## **Evaluations- Security**



- Security of HR is close to LP
- HR under-estimates the security
- More paths reduces the security



# **Evaluations-** Utility



- The utility of HR and LP is close
- More paths reduces utility (because of the higher eavesdropping prob. selected compared to the path failure prob.)



# Future Work

- Using the idea of critical path
  - Finding a critical path in a general graph
- Impact of multi-path on FT and security
  - More realistic and heterogeneous prob. distributions
- Impact of correlation
  - Failure prob. and eavesdropping prob.

