### Responsible data science

# Because of its tremendous **power**, data science must be used **responsibly**







# Online price discrimination

# THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

WHAT THEY KNOW

### Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users' Information

By JENNIFER VALENTINO-DEVRIES, JEREMY SINGER-VINE and ASHKAN SOLTANI December 24, 2012

It was the same Swingline stapler, on the same Staples.com website. But for Kim Wamble, the price was \$15.79, while the price on Trude Frizzell's screen, just a few miles away, was \$14.29.

A key difference: where Staples seemed to think they were located.

#### WHAT PRICE WOULD YOU SEE?



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#### lower prices offered to buyers who live in more affluent neighborhoods

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534



## Job-screening personality tests

# THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

#### By LAUREN WEBER and ELIZABETH DWOSKIN

Sept. 29, 2014 10:30 p.m. ET

### Are Workplace Personality Tests Fair?

Growing Use of Tests Sparks Scrutiny Amid Questions of Effectiveness and Workplace Discrimination



Kyle Behm accused Kroger and six other companies of discrimination against the mentally ill through their use of personality tests. *TROY STAINS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL* 

The Equal Employment Opportunity commission is **investigating whether personality tests discriminate against people with disabilities**.

As part of the investigation, officials are trying to determine if the tests **shut out people suffering from mental illnesses** such as depression or bipolar disorder, even if they have the right skills for the job.

#### http://www.wsj.com/articles/are-workplace-personality-tests-fair-1412044257



# Racial bias in criminal sentencing

### **Machine Bias**

There's software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against blacks.

by Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica May 23, 2016 A commercial tool COMPAS automatically predicts some categories of future crime to assist in bail and sentencing decisions. It is used in courts in the US.



The tool correctly predicts recidivism 61% of the time.

#### Blacks are almost twice as likely as whites to be labeled a higher risk but not actually re-offend.

The tool makes **the opposite mistake among whites**: They are much more likely than blacks to be labeled lower risk but go on to commit other crimes.

https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing



### Transparency



Julia Stoyanovich





### **Transparency themes**

- Online ad targeting: identifying the problem
  - Instant Checkmate / racially identifiable names
  - Ad Fisher
- Explaining black-box models (classifiers)
  - LIME: local interpretable explanations
  - QII: causal influence of features on outcomes
- Software design and testing for fairness (won't cover today)
- From auditing to interpretability: nutritional labels



# Racially identifying names

#### [Latanya Sweeney; CACM 2013]

1



#### Ads by Google

#### Latanya Sweeney, Arrested?

1) Enter Name and State. 2) Access F Checks Instantly. www.instantcheckmate.com/

#### Latanya Sweeney

Public Records Found For: Latanya § www.publicrecords.com/

La Tanya

#### **Racism is Poisoning Online Ad Delivery, Says Harvard Professor**

Google searches involving black-sounding names are more likely to serve up ads suggestive of a criminal record than white-sounding names, says computer scientist



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#### racially identifying names trigger ads suggestive of a criminal record

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/510646/racism-is-poisoning-online-ad-delivery-says-harvard-professor/

### Racially identifying names: observations

#### [Latanya Sweeney; CACM 2013]

- Ads suggestive of a criminal record, linking to Instant Checkmate, appear on google.com and reuters.com in response to searchers for "Latanya Sweeney", "Latanya Farrell"and "Latanya Lockett"\*
- No Instant Checkmate ads when searching for "Kristen Haring", "Kristen Sparrow"\* and "Kristen Lindquist"\*
- \* next to a name that is associated with an arrest record



## Racially identifying names: details

#### [Latanya Sweeney; CACM 2013]

"A greater percentage of Instant Checkmate ads having the word arrest in ad text appeared for black-identifying first names than for white-identifying first names within professional and netizen subsets, too. On Reuters.com, which hosts Google AdSense ads, a black-identifying name was 25% more likely to generate an ad suggestive of an arrest record."

More than 1,100 Instant Checkmate ads appeared on Reuters.com, with 488 having black-identifying first names; of these, 60% used arrest in the ad text. Of the 638 ads displayed with white-identifying names, 48% used arrest. This difference is statistically significant, with less than a 0.1% probability that the data can be explained by chance (chi-square test: X^2 (1)=14.32, p < 0.001).

The EEOC's and U.S. Department of Labor's adverse impact test for measuring discrimination is 77 in this case, so if this were an employment situation, a charge of discrimination might result. (The adverse impact test uses the ratio of neutral ads, or 100 minus the percentages given, to compute disparity: 100-60=40 and 100- 48=52; dividing 40 by 52 equals 77.)

## Racially identifying names: Why?

[Latanya Sweeney; CACM 2013]

Possible explanations (from Latanya Sweeney):

- Does Instant Checkmate serve ads specifically for blackidentifying names?
- Is Google's Adsense explicitly biased in this way?
- Does Google's Adsense learn racial bias based on from clickthrough rates?

How do we know which explanation is right? We need transparency!



### Response

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/510646/racism-is-poisoningonline-ad-delivery-says-harvard-professor/

In response to this blog post, a **Google** spokesperson sends the following comment:

"AdWords does not conduct any racial profiling. We also have an "anti" and violence policy which states that we will not allow ads that advocate against an organisation, person or group of people. It is up to individual advertisers to decide which keywords they want to choose to trigger their ads."

**Instantcheckmate.com** sends the following statement:

"As a point of fact, Instant Checkmate would like to state unequivocally that it has never engaged in racial profiling in Google AdWords. We have absolutely no technology in place to even connect a name with a race and have never made any attempt to do so. The very idea is contrary to our company's most deeply held principles and values."



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## Who is responsible?

- Who benefits?
- Who is harmed?
- What does the law say?
- Who is in a position to mitigate?

### transparency .... responsibility .... TRUST

### Detour: Barrow, Alaska, 1979

Native leaders and city officials, worried about drinking and associated violence in their community **invited a group of sociology researchers** to assess the problem and work with them to devise solutions.

Methodology:

- 10% representative sample (N=88) of everyone over the age of 15 using a 1972 demographic survey
- Interviewed on attitudes and values about use of alcohol
- Obtained psychological histories & drinking behavior
- Given the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test
- Asked to draw a picture of a person (used to determine cultural identity)





# Study "results"

At the conclusion of the study researchers formulated a report entitled **"The Inupiat, Economics and Alcohol on the Alaskan North Slope"**, released **simultaneously** at a press release and to the Barrow community.

The press release was picked up by the New York Times, who ran a front page story entitled **"Alcohol Plagues Eskimos"** 

<b>Alcohol Plagues</b>	Eskimos;	Alcoholism	Plagues Eskimo	
Village				

DAVA SOBEL (); January 22, 1980, , Section Science Times, Page C1, Column , words

PERMISSIONS

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[ DISPLAYING ABSTRACT ]

THE Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska's North Slope, whose culture has been overwhelmed by energy development activities, are "practically committing suicide" by mass alcoholism, University of Pennsylvania researchers said here yesterday. The alcoholism rate is 72 percent among the 2,000 Eskimo men and women in the village of Barrow, where violence is becoming the ...

### Harms and backlash

Study **results were revealed** in the context of a press conference that was held far from the Native village, and **without the presence, much less the knowledge or consent**, of any community member who might have been able to present any context concerning the socioeconomic conditions of the village.

**Study results suggested that nearly all adults in the community were alcoholics.** In addition to the shame felt by community members, the town's Standard and Poor bond rating suffered as a result, which in turn decreased the tribe's ability to secure funding for much needed projects.



### Problems

#### Methodological

#### Edward F. Foulks, M.D., "Misalliances In The Barrow Alcohol Study"

- "The authors once again met with the Barrow Technical Advisory Group, who stated their concern that only Natives were studied, and that outsiders in town had not been included."
- "The estimates of the frequency of intoxication based on association with the probability of being detained were termed "ludicrous, both logically and statistically."

#### Ethical

- Participants not in control of their data
- Significant harm: social (stigmatization) and financial (bond rating)
- No laws were broken, and harms are not about individual privacy!
- Who benefits? Who is harmed?

### data protection .... responsibility .... TRUST



# Back to the future: Online job ads

# theguardian

Samuel Gibbs

Wednesday 8 July 2015 11.29 BST

# Women less likely to be shown ads for high-paid jobs on Google, study shows

Automated testing and analysis of company's advertising system reveals male job seekers are shown far more adverts for high-paying executive jobs



① One experiment showed that Google displayed adverts for a career coaching service for executive jobs 1,852 times to the male group and only 318 times to the female group. Photograph: Alamy

The AdFisher tool simulated job seekers that did not differ in browsing behavior, preferences or demographic characteristics, except in gender.

One experiment showed that Google displayed ads for a career coaching service for "\$200k+" executive jobs **1,852 times to the male group and only 318 times to the female group**. Another experiment, in July 2014, showed a similar trend but was not statistically significant.

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#### https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/08/women-less-likely-ads-high-paid-jobs-google-study

# Ad targeting online

- Users browse the Web, consume content, consume ads (see / click / purchase)
- **Content providers** outsource advertising to third-party ad networks, e.g., Google's DoubleClick
- Ad networks track users across sites, to get a global view of users' behaviors
- Google Ad Settings aims to provide transparency / give control to users over the ads that they see

# do users truly have transparency / choice or is this a placebo button?

### Google Ads Settings



You can block some ads that you don't want to see

#### • All the advertising interests associated with your Google Account will be deleted

#### http://www.google.com/settings/ads



Julia Stoyanovich

this page

### Google Ads Settings

#### Google

Julia

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#### Control your Google ads

You can control the ads that are delivered to you based on your Google Account, across devices, by editing these settings. These ads are more likely to be useful and relevant to you.

#### Your interests



#### http://www.google.com/settings/ads

### AdFisher

#### [A. Datta, M. Tschantz, A. Datta; PETS 2015]

From anecdotal evidence to statistical insight:

#### How do user behaviors, ads and ad settings interact?

Automated randomized controlled experiments for studying online tracking

#### Individual data use transparency: ad

network must share the information it uses about the user to select which ads to serve to him





### AdFisher: methodology

[A. Datta, M. Tschantz, A. Datta; PETS 2015]

- Browser-based experiments, simulated users
  - input: (1) visits to content providing websites;
    (2) interactions with Google Ad Settings
  - output: (1) ads shown to users by Google; (2) change in Google Ad Settings
- Fisher randomized hypothesis testing
  - **null hypothesis** inputs do not affect outputs
  - control and experimental treatments
  - AdFisher can help select a test statistic





### AdFisher: gender and jobs

[A. Datta, M. Tschantz, A. Datta; PETS 2015]

**Non-discrimination**: Users differing only in protected attributes are treated similarly

**Causal test**: Find that a protected attribute changes ads

Experiment 1: gender and jobs

Specify gender (male/female) in Ad Settings, simulate interest in jobs by visiting employment sites, collect ads from Times of India or the Guardian

Result: males were shown ads for higher-paying jobs significantly more often than females (1852 vs. 318)

violation



### AdFisher: substance abuse

[A. Datta, M. Tschantz, A. Datta; PETS 2015]

**Transparency**: User can view data about him used for ad selection

**Causal test**: Find attribute that changes ads but not settings

#### Experiment 2: substance abuse

Simulate interest in substance abuse in the experimental group but not in the control group, check for differences in Ad Settings, collect ads from Times of India

Result: no difference in Ad Settings between the groups, yet significant differences in what ads are served: rehab vs. stocks + driving jobs violation



### AdFisher: online dating

[A. Datta, M. Tschantz, A. Datta; PETS 2015]

Ad choice: Removing an interest decreases the number of ads related to that interest.

**Causal test**: Find that removing an interest causes a decrease in related ads

Experiment 3: online dating

Simulate interest in online dating in both groups, remove "Dating & Personals" from the interests on Ad Settings for experimental group, collect ads

Result: members of experimental group do not get ads related to dating, while members of the control group do

#### compliance



### Explaining black-box classifiers



Julia Stoyanovich



[M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUnRCxnvdCc



[M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

### Three must-haves for a good explanation

Interpretable

• Humans can easily interpret reasoning



### Definitely not interpretable



# Potentially interpretable

slide by Marco Tulio Ribeiro, KDD 2016



[M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

Three must-haves for a good explanation

Interpretable • Humans can easily interpret reasoning						
Faithful	<ul> <li>Describes how this model actually behaves</li> </ul>					
y Learned model Not faithful to model						
	X slide by Marco Tulio Ribeiro, KDD 2016					

[M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

Three must-haves for a good explanation

Interpretable	<ul> <li>Humans can easily interpret reasoning</li> </ul>
Faithful	<ul> <li>Describes how this model actually behaves</li> </ul>
Model agnostic	<ul> <li>Can be used for any ML model</li> </ul>

Can explain this mess 🙂



slide by Marco Tulio Ribeiro, KDD 2016



#### [M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

### Explaining Google's Inception NN











#### slide by Marco Tulio Ribeiro, KDD 2016





#### [M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

### Train a neural network to predict wolf v. husky



### Only 1 mistake!!!

### Do you trust this model? How does it distinguish between huskies and wolves?

slide by Marco Tulio Ribeiro, KDD 2016



#### [M. T. Ribeiro, S. Singh, C. Guestrin; KDD 2016]

### Explanations for neural network prediction



### We've built a great snow detector... 😣

#### slide by Marco Tulio Ribeiro, KDD 2016



### Nutritional labels for data and models



Julia Stoyanovich



### Transparency in ranking

**Input**: database of items (individuals, colleges, cars, ...)

**Score-based ranker:** computes the score of each item using a known formula, e.g., monotone aggregation, then sorts items on score

**Output:** permutation of the items (complete or top-k)

Do we have transparency?

We have syntactic transparency, but lack interpretability!

https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/05/03/refining-the-concept-of-a-nutritional-label-fordata-and-models/

https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/08/05/revealing-algorithmic-rankers/



Reason 1: The scoring formula alone does not indicate the relative rank of an item.

Scores are absolute, rankings are relative. Is 5 a good score? What about 10? 15?



Reason 2: A ranking may be unstable if there are tied or nearly-tied items.

Rank	Institution	Average Count	Faculty
1	Carnegie Mellon University	18.4	123
2	<ul> <li>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</li> </ul>	15.6	64
3	<ul> <li>Stanford University</li> </ul>	14.8	56
4	University of California - Berkeley	11.5	50
5	<ul> <li>University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign</li> </ul>	10.6	56
6	<ul> <li>University of Washington</li> </ul>	10.3	50
7	Georgia Institute of Technology	8.9	81
8	<ul> <li>University of California - San Diego</li> </ul>	8	51
9	Cornell University	7	45
10	<ul> <li>University of Michigan</li> </ul>	6.8	63
11	University of Texas - Austin	6.6	43
12	University of Massachusetts -	6.4	47
	Amherst		



AMW 2017

Reason 3: A ranking methodology may be unstable: small changes in weights can trigger significant re-shuffling.

### THE NEW YORKER

DEPT. OF EDUCATION FEBRUARY 14 & 21, 2011 ISSUE

#### THE ORDER OF THINGS

What college rankings really tell us.



1. Chevrolet Corvette 205

2. Lotus Evora 195

3. Porsche Cayman 195

1. Lotus Evora 205

2. Porsche Cayman 198

3. Chevrolet Corvette 192

1. Porsche Cayman 193

2. Chevrolet Corvette 186

3. Lotus Evora 182





Reason 4: The weight of an attribute in the scoring formula does not determine its impact on the outcome.

Rank	Name	Avg Count	Faculty	Pubs	GRE	
1	CMU	18.3	122	2	791	
2	MIT	15	64	3	772	
3	Stanford	14.3	55	5	800	
4	UC Berkeley	11.4	50	3	789	
5	UIUC	10.5	55	3	772	
6	UW	10.3	50	2	796	
39	U Chicago	2	28	2	779	
40	UC Irvine	1.9	28	2	787	
41	BU	1.6	15	2	783	
41	U Colorado Boulder	1.6	32	1	761	
41	UNC Chapel Hill	1.6	22	2	794	
41	Dartmouth	1.6	18	2	794	

Given a score function: 0.2 \* faculty + 0.3 \* avg cnt +0.5 \* gre



## Rankings are not benign!

### THE NEW YORKER

THE ORDER OF THINGS What college rankings really tell us.

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Rankings are not benign. They enshrine very particular ideologies, and, at a time when American higher education is facing a crisis of accessibility and affordability, we have adopted a de-facto standard of college quality that is uninterested in both of those factors. And why? Because a group of magazine analysts in an office building in Washington, D.C., decided twenty years ago to value selectivity over efficacy, to use proxies that scarcely relate to what they're meant to be proxies for, and to pretend that they can compare a large, diverse, low-cost land-grant university in rural Pennsylvania with a small, expensive, private Jewish university on two campuses in Manhattan.



## Harms of opacity

**1. Due process / fairness.** The subjects of the ranking cannot have confidence that their ranking is meaningful or correct, or that they have been treated like similarly situated subjects - *procedural regularity* 

2. Hidden normative commitments. What factors does the vendor encode in the scoring ranking process (syntactically)? What are the *actual* effects of the scoring / ranking process? Is it stable? How was it validated?



# Harms of opacity

**3. Interpretability.** Especially where ranking algorithms are performing a public function, **political legitimacy** requires that the public be able to interpret algorithmic outcomes in a meaningful way. Avoid *algocracy*: the rule by incontestable algorithms.

**4. Meta-methodological assessment.** Is *a* ranking / *this* ranking appropriate here? Can we use a process if it cannot be explained? Probably yes, for recommending movies; probably not for college admissions.



#### **Ranking Facts**

Recipe			<b>&gt;</b>	← Recipe		Ingredien	ts			÷	← Ingra	edient	ts				
Top 10:				Attribute	Weight	Attribute		Correlati	on		Top 10:						
Attribute	Maximum	Modian	Minimum	PubCount	1.0	PubCount		1.0		<b>U</b> :	Attribute		Maximum	Mad	dian	Minimum	
PubCount	18.3	9.6	62	Faculty	1.0	CSRankingAllArea	1	0.24		Û:	RubCount		18.3	9.6		6.2	
Faculty	122	52.5	45	GRE	1.0	Faculty		0.12		0	CSBankingAl	Area	13	6.5		1	
GRE	800.0	796.3	771.9							۲	Faculty		122	52.5		45	
						Correlation strength between 0.25 and 0.	Correlation strength is based on its absolute value. Correlation over 0.75 is high, between 0.25 and 0.75 is medium, under 0.25 is low.			75 is high,							
Overall:											Overall:						
Attribute	Maximum	Median	Minimum	Diversity at ton-	10	Diversity	overall				Attribute		Maximum	Med	lian	Minimur	n
PubCount	18.3	2.9	1.4	Diversity at top		Directory	overall				PubCount		18.3	2.9		1.4	
Faculty	122	32.0	14	Pagional Code	- DentSizePin -	Region	al Code	=	DeptSizeBir	=	CSRankingAl	Area	48	26.0	1	1	
GRE	800.0	790.0	757.8	Regional Code							Faculty		122	32.0	1	14	
Stability	Sta ranked on genera	bility ted scores (top 100)	<b>→</b> =				W MW				← Fairne	ess					
•	Generated Score			SA Highcharts	Large     Highcharts.com	34	Highcharts.	com	Large Sm	all ghcharts.com			FA*IR	Pairv	vise	Propo	ortion
900											DeptSizeBin	p-value	adjusted a	p-value	α	p-value	α
9 850 e	900000cc			← Stability		Fairness				<b>→</b>	Large	1.0	0.87	0.99	0.05	1.0	0.05
Genera		100 <sub>0000000000000000000000000000000000</sub>		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •							Small	0.0	0.71	0.0	0.05	0.0	0.05
800			00000000000	Тор-К	Stability	DeptSizeBin	FA*IR	Pairwise	Propo	rtion							
				Top-10	Stable	Large	Fair			$\odot$	Top K = 26 in FA*	IR and Prop	ortion oracles. S	etting of top	K: In FA	*IR and Prop	ortion
750	10 20	30 40 Rank Position	50 60 Highcharts.com	Overall	Stable	Small	Unfair	Unfair	😢 Unfair	۲	whole ranking as implemented as s	input. FA*IR	is computed as st 4.1.3 in Propo	using code i rtion paper.	in FA*IR	codes. Prop	ortion is
Slope at top-1 Unstable when abs threshold). Otherw	0: -6.91. Slope ov solute value of slope of ise it is stable.	erall: -1.61. fit line in scatter plo	ot <= 0.25 (slope			Unfair when p-value	of correspondi	ng statistical test <:	= 0.05.								

http://demo.dataresponsibly.com/rankingfacts/nutrition\_facts/

[K. Yang, J. Stoyanovich, A. Asudeh, B. Howe, HV Jagadish, G. Miklau; SIGMOD 2018]



### Responsible data science

# Because of its tremendous **power**, data science must be used **responsibly**





